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Since the famous passage in which Socrates (Plato 1997) says that the unexamined, and therefore non-
reﬂected, life is not worth living, “reﬂection” has been a diffuse and iterant term in ethics, moral philosophy,
epistemology, political philosophy (Tiberius 2008; Skorupski 2010), but also in psychology (Marsico et al.
2015). This volume opens a new perspective on the topic of reﬂection, considering the most recent approaches







1.1.  Introductory Remarks
Since the famous passage in which Socrates (Plato 1997) says that the unexamined, and therefore non-reﬂected,
life is not worth living, “reﬂection” has been a diffuse and iterant term in ethics, moral philosophy, epistemology,
political philosophy (Tiberius 2008; Skorupski 2010), but also in psychology (Marsico et al. 2015). This volume
opens a new perspective on the topic of reﬂection, considering the most recent approaches in both philosophy
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There is an uncontroversial epistemic sense of “reﬂection” as the act of understanding that enables the formation
of ideas which cannot be directly obtained from external things via empirical experience. This deﬁnition covers
the acts of the person who allows herself to think, doubt, and compare her own psychological states and actions.
Kornblith (2002) recognizes that reﬂecting on one’s own belief is characteristic of human life:
We sometimes wonder whether the beliefs we have are ones we ought to have. And we sometimes wonder about
beliefs we might come to adopt, whether we ought to adopt them. More than this, such reﬂection does not seem,
at least typically, to be an idle academic exercise. (Kornblith 2002, p. 103)
In everyday life, we have thoughts whose objects are neither observed things or events nor other people’s
accounts, but our own beliefs or actions. In this sense, “reﬂecting” is a common mental activity.
The acknowledgement of the ordinary capability to consider our own psychological states and our own actions
can lead to a more problematic (controversial) and stronger thesis: reﬂection is a condition for being human
(moral and epistemic) agents. In fact, for a broad tradition, “reﬂection” is a term frequently associated with the
admirable and valuable search for moral and epistemic clarity and to the meaning of human agency. Even though
we share with other animals the capability of simple actions (e.g. to act according to ﬁrst-order beliefs and
desires, like dogs or whales), the “exercise of human agency consists in judgment and behavior ordered by self-
conscious reﬂection about what to think and do” (Doris 2015, p. x). In moral philosophy, for instance, many
philosophers think that morality of human action is the outcome of free will of a subject able to reﬂect about her
own desires and beliefs (Frankfurt 1971). They also think that the capability of reﬂective access to one’s own
beliefs, desires, motivations etc. is essential to the possibility of moral deliberation and freedom of action
(Korsgaard 1996). In epistemology, many philosophers claim that only an agent provided with the capability to
forming second-order beliefs by reﬂection can justify and warrant her beliefs, after examining and testing her
own ﬁrst-order states (ﬁrst-order beliefs and desires) and to know in the relevant sense (Chisholm 1973; Bonjour
1985; Sosa 2007).
As we know, we usually form beliefs unreﬂectively and we act unreﬂectively in virtue of our involvement with
the natural and social world around us. It is of course common that, during the process of ﬁrst-order beliefs
formation, we are subject to errors, biases, and unreliable sources of information. These risks affect our
capability of achieving the truth or acting in a correct way. For these reasons, for many thinkers, to give up
examining the process of beliefs formation and their contents is “to neglect the pursuit of truth” (Bonjour 1985,
p. 8). To accept a belief that has not been reﬂectively examined “is, one might say, epistemically irresponsible”
(Bonjour 1985, p. 8), as well as morally irresponsible (Korsgaard 2008, p.100). In this sense, a reﬂection would
have a direct and necessary relation with the nature and the life as rational beings. According to this perspective,
there is a rational agent if there is someone who has justiﬁed belief, and acts justiﬁably, because has a self-
conscious perspective about her own beliefs and acts. Only a self-critical reﬂection can provide such a condition,
and it would be lacking in “mere animals” (McDowell 1994, pp. 108–126; Frankfurt 1999, pp. 105–106).
AQ4
This is why the notions of reﬂection and agency have walked together. In general, one talks about epistemic
agency when a person consciously stops, reﬂects and questions herself about what she has to believe or to do. In
this case, an agent would be the one who, after performing an evaluation of her own states, is able to assess the
reliability of her own epistemic or practical performance, to give credit to her own beliefs, and become
responsible for her own actions. We no longer merely have beliefs and are only aware of those beliefs. Once the
reﬂection allows us to distance ourselves from our own mental states and put them in question (Korsgaard 1996,
p. 93), we turn into an agent towards our own beliefs and actions. The reﬂexive character of human
understanding implies the question of the normativity of agency. We turn our attention towards ourselves, our
own internal states, and we become self-conscious of our own intentions, desires, beliefs, attitudes and of the
way those states have been formed (Nagel 1996, p. 200).
1.1.1.  Taking Reflection Seriously
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However, according to other philosophers, the supposed capability of accessing, controlling, evaluating and
deciding about one’s own beliefs; as well as the capability of producing new beliefs based exclusively on
reﬂection; and the capability of acting on the basis of reﬂexive self-consciousness, is a mere illusion, or
something at least very limited (Goldman 1979; Tiberius 2008; Kahneman 2011; Kornblith 2012; Engel 2013;
Hieronymi 2014; Proust 2013; Doris 2015).  There is an intense debate around the disagreement about the place
and value of reﬂection in the cognitive and moral human economy.
What exactly is at stake, here? In fact, the philosophical dispute about the nature and value of reﬂection revolves
around a family of arguments that generally include at least one of the following six aspects:
(i) the issue of epistemic accessibility: epistemic accessibility asserts that for a person to be epistemically
justiﬁed in having a belief, it is not sufﬁcient for this belief to be true (this is, in fact, necessary, but not
sufﬁcient). In addition, it must be possible that they can become aware by reﬂection of the reasons that
guarantee that this belief is true;
(ii) the issue of epistemic voluntarism: a strong voluntarism about our doxastic states usually defends that
when we reﬂect, our beliefs are typically formed by means of a decision and our knowledge of our own
beliefs is explained by the fact that we decide what to believe in and not because of something that we
discover about our minds;
(iii) the skeptical issue of justiﬁcation: if an individual sustains the belief that p and not the belief that ¬p,
she must have a reason for it. If the individual declares that she has such a reason, then we may ask her
to present it, and to defend it against the three objections: inﬁnite regress (where the reason refers to
another reason which, in turn, refers to another reason, ad inﬁnitum); vicious circularity (where this
reason is sustained on a previously presented reason), and; arbitrary assumption (where the reason is
not sustained on anything);
(iv) the issue of the principle of epistemic responsibility: for many actors epistemic justiﬁcation is the
essential relationship between the individual and the consequences of their belief and, in this sense,
accepting a belief in the absence of such reason is epistemologically irresponsible. Hence, reﬂection
appears to be a necessary condition for the revision of our reasons and for epistemic responsibility;
(v) the issue of overintellectualization: from an internalist perspective (which tends to over intellectualize
our cognitive activities), knowledge attribution seems to be rare (there are only a few cases of people
knowing/ﬁnding out about something because they reﬂect, ﬁnd reasons and justify their beliefs) when
people are able to intellectually examine their own performances and cognitive achievements;
(vi) the issue of luminosity: luminosity refers to the requirement that an individual is not only able to know
that p (ﬁrst-order thought), but also – and mainly – to know that they know that p (second-order
thought) by reﬂection.
In the current debate, these points may appear separate or combined.
This is not a mere scholastic debate. An eloquent example of the relevance of this subject lies in psychology,
which is caught into an epistemological paradox. Although it is considered that one’s own psychological
experience is only accessible through introspection (Bühler 1907/1999), scientiﬁc psychology only admits
knowledge built through intersubjective means. Basically, the knowledge about one’s own psychological
experiences (thoughts, emotions, etc.) has no epistemic value in psychology, unless it is validated through an
intersubjective procedure or method (measuring, interviewing, testing, scanning, etc.) mediated by an apparatus
(tests, items, fMRI, etc.). The mediation of external elements is considered crucial for “reﬂection to be reliable
and valid is an anchor point in a “reality” that is accessible to others for critical discussion.” (Van Seggelen–
Damen et al. 2017, p. 794).
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The question is complicated also by the fact that reﬂection has not only to do with thinking, but with all the
psychic processes and even with action. This is why “reﬂection” is often referred to as a “fuzzy” term in
psychology (Van Seggelen–Damen et al. 2017). It can refer to self-perception, to meta-cognition, to emotion
regulation, but also to self-efﬁcacy and self-assessment (Dunning 2005). When it refers to action or practices,
especially professionals reﬂecting on their own practices, it is often called “reﬂexivity” (Marsico et al. 2015).
This complexity is also caused by the fact that a large part of psychology has agreed to separate the different
psychic processes (emotion, cognition, reﬂection, perception, imagination, etc.) not only for analytical purposes,
but giving them a different ontological status. So, it becomes problematic when one needs to account for the
content of any psychic act: what is the “composition” of such an act? Is it more cognition, or more emotion?
Does it exist an act, which is a pure product of a single process (e.g. a pure act of cognition)?
We started from quiet waters (to a trivial afﬁrmation of which we have the capacity to reﬂect), and, with only a
few strokes, we arrive in turbulent waters …
1.2.  What Is the Nature, Cognitive Role and Epistemic Value of
the Reflective Scrutiny?
Besides the general agreement about the human capability of reﬂection, there is a large area of disagreement and
debate about the nature and value of “reﬂective scrutiny” and the role of “second-order states” in everyday life.
This problem has been discussed in a vast and heterogeneous literature about topics such as epistemic injustice,
epistemic norms, agency, understanding, meta-cognition etc. However, there is not yet any extensive and
interdisciplinary work, speciﬁcally focused on the topic of the epistemic value of reﬂection. This volume is one
of the ﬁrst attempts aimed at providing an innovative contribution, an exchange between philosophy,
epistemology and psychology about the place and value of reﬂection in everyday life.
Our goal in the next sections is not to offer an exhaustive overview of recent work on epistemic reﬂection, nor to
mimic all of the contributions made by the chapters in this volume. We will try to highlight some topics that have
motivated a new resumption of this ﬁeld and, with that, drawing on chapters from this volume where relevant.
Two elements deﬁned the scope and content of this volume, On the one hand, the crucial contribution of Ernest
Sosa, whose works provide original and thought-provoking contributions to contemporary epistemology in
setting a new direction for old dilemmas about the nature and value of knowledge, giving a central place to
reﬂection (Greco 2004; Turri 2013; Bahr and Seidel 2016) (it will be developed in 2.1). On the other hand, the
recent developments of cultural psychology, in the version of the “Aalborg approach” (Valsiner et al. 2016),
reconsider the object and scope of psychological sciences, stressing that “[h]uman conduct is purposeful”
(Valsiner 2015, p. 80). This theoretical shift implies as consequence that psychology should take into account
how:
the conduct is constructed by goals-oriented agents (persons) who posit a future state of possible affairs and then
proceed to construct it (…). Agency is a necessary starting point for understanding human conduct—there is no
structure of any human invention—external or internal (subjective)—without its maker. (Valsiner 2015, p. 80).
The object of psychological sciences becomes the phenomena of collectively coordinated, personally meaningful
conducts. In this sense, any product of human activity, from art to food production, from child rearing to
mediation, from killing to architecture, becomes a legitimate arena for the study of psychological experience.
Every human production is at the same time unique, as the result of purposeful action in a given time/space, and
collectively coordinated, as it is both the producer and the product of human history in the irreversible ﬂowing of
time (it will be developed in 2.1).
These two independent perspectives do not cover of course the whole of the current debate about reﬂection in the
current heterogeneous and rich landscape of philosophy and psychology. However, a productive dialogue
between these two essential perspectives can be very useful, in order to better understand both the normative and
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generative aspects of human cognition and action. Both perspectives touch the core of human cognitive and its
relation to our daily practices in a social world. We think that the philosopher, the psychologist, the jurist and the
social scientist will beneﬁt from the discussion unfolding in the chapters.
1.2.1.  Epistemic Agency and Reflective Scrutiny
Following Aristotelian inspiration, the work of Sosa (1991) led to a shift in the focus of epistemological
investigation. The classical analysis of knowledge used to focus on the nature of belief. Sosa instead maintained
that epistemology should focus on the character and virtues of the agent. So, this approach became known as
virtue epistemology. In “belief-based” epistemology, the beliefs are the primary object of the epistemic
evaluation, the fundamental concepts are “knowledge”, “justiﬁcation” and “justiﬁed belief”. In its turn, in virtue
epistemology, the primary object of the epistemic evaluation are the agents, their character and performances. In
this case, the crucial concepts are persons’ “capabilities”, “powers”, “competences”, “disposition”, “acquired
habits”, “expertise”, that contribute to the successful achievement of their cognitive goals.
Sosa’s virtue epistemology (2007, 2009) provides a new perspective to the disputes that monopolized the
epistemological debates of the 1960s and 1980s, between, on the one hand, foundational and coherentist theories
about epistemic justiﬁcation and, on the other hand, externalist and internalist conceptions about the nature of
knowledge.  These foundational and coherentist, externalist and internalist positions address aspects relevant to
our cognitive lives, however, their defenders are inclined to refute other positions, even when they contain
intuitively relevant ideas: can we set aside the idea that we are natural beings and that the way in which we are
embedded in the natural world plays a constitutive role in our mental lives? Can we also reject the idea that
reﬂection and a broad understanding of our cognitive achievements play a central role in our lives? Sosa offers a
solution to these disputes.
From Knowledge in Perspective (Sosa 1991) to Reﬂective Knowledge: Apt Belief and Reﬂective Knowledge
(Sosa 2009), Sosa defends a bi-level epistemology based on a distinction between animal knowledge (AK) and
reﬂective knowledge (RK).  In Sosa (1985, p. 240) the following distinction is established:
(AK) One has animal knowledge about one’s environment, one’s past, and one’s own experience if one’s
judgments and beliefs about these are direct responses to their impact – e.g., through perception or
memory – with little or no beneﬁt of reﬂection or understanding.
(RK) One has reﬂective knowledge if one’s judgment or belief manifests not only such direct response to
the fact known but also understanding of its place in a wider whole that includes one’s belief and
knowledge of it and how these come about.
These deﬁnitions undergo later reﬁnements, but the general meaning remains. Beliefs are a special case of
performance, epistemic performances: when a true belief is attributed to the subject’s competence under the
appropriate conditions, this count as an apt belief and as a kind of knowledge, animal knowledge (Sosa 2007, p.
93). An agent has animal knowledge if his belief is apt, in other words: a) the belief is true (it achieves its
objective), b) if the belief is the manifestation of the subject’s skills, c) if the belief is true because it arises from
the subject’s competence; then he does not arrive at the truth by accident (Sosa 2007, p. 92).
Reﬂective knowledge, on the other hand, is knowledge acquired as the result of the rational epistemic agent’s
intentional and conscious investigation. Reﬂective knowledge requires not only apt belief but also defensible apt
belief, in other words, an apt belief in which the subject aptly believes that it is apt and where the subject’s
aptness may be defended against skeptical objections (Sosa 2007, p. 24). While animal knowledge only requires
that a belief is true, reﬂective knowledge additionally requires that the agent have an epistemic perspective “from
which he endorses the source of that belief, from which he can see that source as reliably truth-conducive” (Sosa
2009, p. 135).
In the ﬁrst case (AK), one may talk of “animal competence”, since it does not require the cognitive agent to





01/04/2019 e.Prooﬁng | Springer
eprooﬁng.springer.com/books_v2/printpage.php?token=y3vis5VlWMEbbET7K-QO2Res9PVw_iXu4mSZzRaPvBM 6/15
the appropriateness of the conditions for the exercise of the competence in forming that belief.” (Sosa 2011, pp.
149–50). In the second case (RK), one may talk of reﬂective justiﬁcation, rather than justiﬁcation only arising
from reliability. The (RK) case requires a rational endorsement of the reliability of the competence exercised by
the agent and the “appropriateness of the conditions for its exercise” (Sosa 2011, p. 15). In these terms, reﬂective
knowledge goes beyond animal knowledge (Sosa 2007, p. 108).
In this perspective, reﬂection is not necessary for knowledge in its most basic or animal sense. We know
animally even when we are not apt to justify and to present reasons in favor of our knowledge. However, in a
scenario of epistemic evaluation, when the subject is challenged to assess the status of their beliefs in the light of
epistemic values, when it is necessary to declare that one’s belief is true, competent, safe, coherent etc., in the
face of skeptical objections (Sosa 2009, pp. 136–7), it is necessary for the epistemic agent to undertake a
cognitive performance which is able to endorse the source of this belief and guarantee its reliability, forming a
meta-apt or fully apt belief (Sosa 2011, p. 10).
This, according to Sosa, is what characterizes the knowledge problem in the epistemological tradition from
Sextus to Descartes. Thus, from the point of view of epistemic evaluation:
Apt belief, animal knowledge, is better than belief that succeeds in its aim, being true, without being apt. Apt
belief aptly noted, reﬂective knowledge, is better than mere apt belief or animal knowledge, especially when the
reﬂective knowledge helps to guide the ﬁrst-order belief so that it is apt. (Sosa 2011, pp. 12–13)
The reﬂective knowledge ‘that p’ is epistemically better than the stand-alone animal knowledge ‘that p’ because
“the safer, better justiﬁed, and more reliably acquired beliefs constitute better knowledge” (Sosa 2009, p. 136).
However, in Judgment and Agency the distinction between animal and reﬂective knowledge gives way to a
sharper distinction between animal knowledge and knowing full well. This is because knowing full well
necessarily involves reﬂective knowledge. This is due to the fact that our “rational nature is most fully manifest
in such reasoned choice and judgment” (Sosa 2015, p. 51). An epistemic performance is fully apt – and not
merely apt – if this performance is guided towards aptness through the agent’s reﬂectively apt risk assessment,
examining his own competency and aptness.
The chapters of the ﬁrst section of the volume try to establish a frank and constructive dialogue with these ideas.
The second part of the book introduces instead the perspective of cultural psychology on the complex and
ongoing question of the different levels of psychological experience. Psychology is indeed dealing with different
dimension of psychological phenomena. The meaning of psychological events seems indeed to emerge from
complex interaction between levels of systemic organization (the embodied self, the unconscious and pre-
semiotic production of meaning, the ﬁrst-order experience, the reﬂective and ﬁnally the social). Each of the
levels feeds into the other. While generally the different branches of psychology tends to take into account each
level separately, the challenge of cultural psychology is exactly to understand the articulation and mutual
relationships between the levels.
1.2.2.  Psychological Experience and Reflection
According to the review by Van Seggelen–Damen et al. (2017), there are at least three different approaches
toward reﬂection in contemporary psychology:
• reﬂection as self-awareness. In this approach, the investigation of personal knowledge structures by means
of introspection is emphasized (Mann et al. 2009; Procee 2006).
• reﬂection as self-reference. This approach considers the self–other relationships as relevant in reﬂection. It
considers reﬂection as a process of evaluation of self-reference with respect to the evaluation of the others
and by the others, rather than reﬂection as critical activity (Gürtner et al. 2007; Van Woerkom and Croon
2008).
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• reﬂection as self-inquiry. This approach focuses on “epistemic” interests and value of reﬂection. It is
interested in the self-questioning assumptions one previously has taken for granted (Livengood et al. 2010;
Trapnell and Campbell 1999).
Van Seggelen–Damen et al. (2017) also stress the preoccupation of psychology with the empirical study of
reﬂection. Because of the epistemological paradox above mentioned, psychology cannot trust ﬁrst person reports
without constraining them into allegedly controlled procedures of production and measurement of reﬂection.
Valsiner (2017) claims that, in the very end, any method in psychology requires the research subject to perform
but a controlled and constrained act of introspection. The introspective act consists of “self-observation of
internal processes. It presupposes conscious inner perception and can refer to feelings, thoughts, ideas,
memories, sensations and perceptions. It can arise unintentionally or spontaneously or be brought about
arbitrarily.” (Burkart 2018, p. 169) Initially, introspection in psychology derived directly from reﬂection, as for
Brentano (1874/2012) internal perception of one’s own mental processes was the main starting point for
psychology. Later on, introspection became the main method of the Würzburg School (1896–1909), where the
typical experimental setting included a test supervisor and an introspecting test person. The test person had to be
a researcher trained in self-observation, usually employees of the institute (Burkart 2018). The test person was
presented with complex and everyday tasks and was initially supposed to deal silently with thinking tasks that
the research director had given them.
Examples are of questions were: “Can you get to Berlin in seven hours from here?” or “Can we grasp the essence
of thought with our thinking?” (Bühler 1907/1999, p. 163) The test supervisor would then ask something like
“do you understand?” and the test person would answer “no” or “yes” and then exploring her own process of
thinking, under the guidance of the experimenter. This method was later considered “unscientiﬁc” because too
subjective by an experimental psychology striving for the recognition as positive science. However, the
introspective method of the nineteenth century has never been a pure subjective one. It was actually a complex
social situation of dialogue between researcher and participant (Tateo 2015).
Other approaches later claimed that it does not exist something as a person thinking about her own psychological
processes alone. The socio-constructivist (Pfadenhauer and Knoblauch 2019) and dialogical (Marková 2016)
approaches maintain that psychic life emerges from social relationships, to the extent that any inner-dialogue is a
dialogue with an internalized social other. The persons, ideas, music, norms, values we encounter in social life
become part of our society of the Self (Hermans 2002). They constitute a polyphony of inner voices,
representing different internalized social positions, that constantly develop a dialogue when we talk to ourselves.
There are some attempts to bring together the introspective and the intersubjective forms to access psychic
experience by developing a method of dialogical introspection (Burkart 2018). The method aims at the
exploration of the conscious content of experience (inner processes such as feelings, thoughts, intentions and
ideas, both current and remembered) through a group discussion led by a research coordinator (Burkart 2018).
The main idea is that subsequent rounds of small group discussions allow the elaboration, interpretation, control
and reliability of the introspective materials. In this last approach, one can see the attempt to articulate the
relationships between the levels of psychological experience. The person is at the same time subject and object
of psychological life. The body is at the same time percipient and mean of perception. The collectively
coordinated activities, the social, is at the same time the arena of experience and the frame for the meaning. All
these interactions between levels set the frame for the reﬂective move. Reﬂection is a dialogical process, to the
extent that the voice of the other and my own voice as “other” are necessary conditions to build both a
relationship and a differentiation. Without this “inclusive separation” (Valsiner 2017, p. 102), no reﬂective move
and no articulation between levels of the Psyche system would be possible.
1.3.  A Map to the Book
Chapters are organized in the following way: the ﬁrst section collects ﬁve philosophical texts, four of which
discussing the problem of reﬂection in relation to the inﬂuential arguments of Ernest Sosa. The ﬁfth chapter,
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“Philosophical Reﬂection and Rashness” by Plínio J. Smith, is not directly reacting to Sosa’s philosophy and to
contemporary epistemology. Smith presents indeed a larger picture of the relationship between reﬂection and
philosophical investigation as prolegomena to the second section of the book.
The second section is composed of four chapters that try to provide an overview of the rich theoretical
production in cultural psychology. The authors focus on the articulation between different levels of the Psyche:
the body, the self, the other and the group. Any of these dimensions is characterized by being both subject and
object, producer and product of the human psychological experience and the action in the world. What is
particularly evident is the variety and the frontier nature of the cultural references provided. It is a main
characteristic of cultural psychology that of looking for a constant dialogue between disciplines and worldviews.
We will now provide details about the single chapters in the two sections.
1.3.1.  Philosophical Reflectiveness
In the ﬁrst chapter, “Animal versus Reﬂective Orders of Epistemic Competence”, Ernest Sosa presents one of the
central themes of his Virtue Epistemology. Differently from epistemological tradition, according to Sosa,
judgment and knowledge itself are forms of intentional action or performance, not just simple psychological
states. This type of intentional action includes a certain normative structure of success, competence and aptness,
or success that manifests competence. In his chapter, Sosa focuses on the notion of competence as a disposition
or ability to succeed when one tries, as for instance the competence to drive safely on a given road. Therefore, an
epistemic competence is a disposition (capability) to be successful when trying to reach an epistemic good (such
as truth, knowledge, etc.). In this sense, in his bi-level epistemology, one can talk about ﬁrst-order competences
and second-order competences. The “animal knowledge” is a belief whose truth shows a ﬁrst-order competence
of the believer (e.g. to perceive a body or to remember an event). Instead, “reﬂective knowledge requires more of
one’s ﬁrst-order apt belief, which now must also manifest a second-order competence, the believer’s second-
order competence to judge whether ﬁrst-order belief is or would be apt” (Sosa, Chap. 2, this volume). A subject’s
reﬂective competences resides in the ability to judge, and judgment is both the act of afﬁrming something with
an intention and the disposition to consciously judge. Without falling back into vicious regress, reﬂection is
required in judgment, because the agent who judges afﬁrms fully aptly only if guided to a correct and apt
afﬁrmation by second-order awareness of their competence to so afﬁrm.
Christoph Kelp, in the chapter “The Status of Reﬂection in Virtue Epistemology”, examines the arguments of
Ernest Sosa about the role of reﬂection in epistemology. He claims that the main normative thesis of Sosa (that
the ultimately desirable status for performances in general is the full aptness) can be subject of the objection of
overintellectualisation of epistemic processes.  Kelp proposes a way to safeguard Sosa’s perspective from this
objection: to replace the Normative Thesis (NT), expressing the idea of full aptness, with the thesis that the
ultimately desirable state of performances in general is the Simple Normative Thesis (SNT), stating that the fully
desirable status for performances in general is (simple ﬁrst-order) aptness. The central point is that the Simple
ﬁrst-order aptness does not require reﬂective competence. Therefore, (SNT) allows us to remain on the side of
Sosa’s virtue epistemology, by dealing with human knowledge as a type of judgment, which is not subject to
skepticism and to the ﬂaws of epistemic performances, without necessarily recurring to meta-epistemic
performances. In other words, despite Kelp accepts the relevance of Sosa’s epistemology, he does not
acknowledge that Sosa’s arguments can re-appreciate the place of reﬂection in epistemology. According to Kelp,
virtue epistemologists must still agree that reﬂection has been dethroned in epistemology.
In the third chapter, “The Social Value of Reﬂection”, John Greco recognizes that reﬂection, understood as
metacognitive activity, has been a recurring theme in philosophy. However, he argues against the idea that
reﬂection is necessary to the attribution of knowledge to an individual. On the contrary, Greco thinks that a
metacognitive requirement can turn knowledge unachievable, impossible for an individual. Even though, Greco
maintains that reﬂection has a (relevant) epistemic value: it represents an argument in favor of the idea that the
primary value of metacognitive activity is social. The reﬂective act (thinking about our own thinking) contributes
to our capability of intellectual cooperation: in practice, how to plan, coordinate, execute and assess the activities
with the others. In his chapter, Greco also deals with the topic of epistemic agency. If it is true that human
7
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agency requires both conscious and self-controlled thinking, it is implausible to attribute conscious and self-
directed thinking to any instance of genuine agency. The question is: how does is possible that conscious and
self-directed thinking is a requirement for human action, while it is not a requirement for every individual act of
agency? According to Greco, human agency is a social agency. It thus requires relevant capabilities both for
conscious thinking and for second-order thinking in the process of interacting with other persons during
cooperative tasks.
In “Disagreement, Intellectual Humility and Reﬂection”, Duncan Pritchard explores the theme of reﬂection
starting from an intellectual virtue: the intellectual humility in scenarios of disagreement between epistemic
peers, that is disagreements between epistemic agents that are in a position which is not expressing any epistemic
advantage over the interlocutor.  For Pritchard, answering to a disagreement with an epistemic peer by an
attitude rather than conciliation (i.e., a downgrading of one’s conviction in the contested proposition) is
incompatible with the requirements of intellectual humility. Intellectual humility requires reﬂection: “What is
certainly true is that encountering an epistemic peer disagreement requires one to reﬂect on the nature of one’s
epistemic standing with regard to the target proposition” (Pritchard, Chap. 5, this volume). Thanks to this,
[e]ngaging in reﬂection in this way is how one avoids the intellectual vice of dogmatism” (Pritchard, Chap. 5,
this volume). Pritchard contends that, in case of an epistemic performance in scenarios of disagreement, it is
virtuous when the agent reﬂects upon the epistemic position towards the target proposition. It is worth noting that
such a reﬂection is not to be understood as incompatible with the fact that the agent continues believing in the
target proposition. A virtuous and reliable understanding of intellectual humility is reasonably compatible with
the act of keeping the original judgment.
The last chapter of the ﬁrst section, “Philosophical Reﬂection and Rashness”, by Plínio Junqueira Smith, does
not directly deal with Sosa’s approach to reﬂection within contemporary epistemology. It does not present a
theory of reﬂection either. The chapter rather focuses on the philosophical reﬂection and on the nature of
philosophical investigation, mainly referring to Pyrrhonian skepticism.  Following a Pyrrhonian precept, Smith
begins with the idea that the most important confrontation in philosophy is the conﬂict between skeptics and
dogmatics. The chapter starts by explaining the terms of the conﬂict between skeptics and dogmatics. Thereafter,
Smith describes the philosophical investigation as a type of reﬂection with two complementary sides: on the one
side, philosophers reﬂect upon ordinary thinking, trying to produce a better worldview; on the other side,
philosophers reﬂect upon the philosophical outcomes of the former reﬂection. Smith suggests that, as both
skeptics and dogmatics strive for the truth in philosophical investigation, they do it suing different types of
abilities under different conditions. In this sense, one can say that there is a skeptic reﬂection and a dogmatic
reﬂection, about commonsense beliefs as well as about philosophical beliefs. In the ﬁnal part of the chapter,
Smith claims the superiority of a skeptic attitude, also called Neopyrrhonism. According to Smith, the Pyrrhonist
is sincerer in relation to the philosophic requirements of impartiality and rationality, while dogmatics get
sometimes away from it. This is the reason for the skeptic still charges dogmatic with recklessness, as the latter
interrupts his investigation too early. A decisive point, extremely frequent in literature, is that the skeptic looks to
suspend the judgment while at the same time investigating the truth. The baseline is that, in the case of the
Pyrrhonist skeptic, the tranquility is not a product of philosophical investigation, rather one of its conditions.
With the concept of “tranquility”, we introduce a clearly psychological notion. Psychology is indeed the place of
articulation between different levels. Here, reﬂection is not understood as a metacognitive process. It is a rather
complex question of thinking about oneself, of recognizing the affective dimensions of such thinking, but also
become reﬂective about one’s affects. It means becoming aware of inhabiting one’s own body, but also of the
body as an agent of knowledge. Reﬂection, ﬁnally, means to consider humans as agents, but also as colonized
agents, as both producer and products of social relationships and normatively guided unique personal
trajectories, of historical conditions and of personal history. All these aspects converge into the question of
meaning-making, which constitutes the object of the second section of this volume.
1.3.2.  Psychological Reflectiveness
8
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The second section of the book is opened by the chapter of Robert E. Innis, “Between Feeling and
Symbolization: Philosophical Paths to Thinking about Oneself”. Innis is a perfect example of the frontier vision
of cultural psychology. As philosopher, semioticians, phenomenologist and cultural psychologist, he rotates the
different facets of reﬂection in human life. He discusses a large number of views that converge towards his idea
of reﬂection as a dialogue with oneself. Such a dialogue points in two directions: it turns towards an inner
inﬁnity, exploring the realm of self-knowledge; and towards an outer inﬁnity, looking at the right categories that
mediate our understanding of what we are and what we do. This twofold activity is historically situated in a
double sense: it is the history of my own development (where I am and how I did get there, and where I will be
in the future) in the arena of the historical development (the social and historical context of my being). These
fourfold directions constantly feed into each other, as in the case of spirituality, in which the most personal and
deepest inﬁnities of my self can converge on the unspeakable categories of universal inﬁnity, that I can feel but
not verbalize. One of the most intriguing questions raised by Innis is indeed the relationship between signs and
reﬂection in human experience.
The second chapter by Shogo Tanaka, “Bodily origin of self-reﬂection and its socially extended aspects”,
provides a relevant reﬂection about the embodied nature of reﬂection. One can say that philosophy has
sometimes overlooked the fact that we do not just have a body, rather we are bodies. Besides, as Tanaka shows
discussing the concepts of phenomenology, humans create through the body the dialogical relationship of
subject/object/mean with the world. This relationship is the stem of reﬂection as well as of social interactions.
Tanaka stresses a fundamental contribution of cultural psychology to epistemology: the ambivalent and
ambiguous dimension of psychological experience. Ambiguity is not a condition of unachieved knowledge, it is
rather the dynamic element of knowing. Ambivalence and ambiguity are inherent to the embodied nature of the
self in the world. Thus, a theory of reﬂection must also incorporate the open-ended aspects of Psyche, as they are
suggested by psychological investigation.
The third chapter of the second section, “Psychological reﬂection, thought and imagination as epistemic skills”,
by Miika Vähämaa, discusses a different angle of the relationship between social epistemology and cultural
psychology. In a way or another, reﬂection cannot but rely on language, yet language is a historically situated
phenomenon. Therefore, Vähämaa asks, what does it happen in our times when language and the capability of a
shared ground for virtuous human relationships, the common sense, is subject to radical changes? Re-
appreciating a concept of common sense that dates back at least to Giambattista Vico, Vähämaa proposes the
idea of epistemic skills enhanced by imagination and group support in order to empower the persons’ reﬂective
competences (Vähämaa 2018). Reﬂection is not only a matter of formal logic, but it is also about the capability
of accessing multiple logics (e.g. common sense logic, affective logic, imaginative e logic) that enable us to feel
virtuous members of our community. In other words, the chapters dialogues with the idea of virtues as
characteristics of the agent in relation to a moral dimension. Thus, if we can become more virtuous epistemic
agent it will also be thanks to the development of the skill to be better members of our group and to contribute,
through reﬂection, to the betterment of the group itself: the original meaning of the concept of “common sense”.
The volume ends with the chapter “Mirrors and Reﬂexive processes: From looking oneself in the mirror to
sensemaking one’s own experience. Insidious paths between semiotics, cultural psychology and dynamic
psychology” by Raffaele De Luca Picione. Using the metaphor of the mirror, the chapter provides a thoughtful
and exhaustive overview of the theoretical and epistemological open question about reﬂection in cultural
psychology and therapy. The reﬂecting Psyche indeed implies the capability to recognize itself as subjective
position in the ﬁrst person and in relationship with otherness. This generates a self-image, based on an epistemic
perspective that cannot coincide with the experience of the world. Which image is more faithful? My own self-
image or the image that is mirrored by the world? What kind of means I have to assess it?
De Luca Picione suggests that, ﬁrst of all, the reﬂection process does not produce a static image. The example of
therapy is a clear illustration of the fact that reﬂection is not a solipsistic process. One can think about therapy as
the frame in which the self-reﬂection process is guided by speciﬁc techniques. Besides, the chapter reminds us
that reﬂection implies a dynamic overcoming of the present time, integrating the thinking into a temporal
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perspective. The here and now of my thoughts and actions is always in relation to a past, reformulating memory
processes, and to a future of expectations, plans and imaginative processes.
1.4.  Conclusions
What is the place and value of reﬂection in people’s lives? The answer requires a careful discussion about the
relationship between our epistemic performances, our intellectual capabilities and competencies, our affective
relationships with the environment, our actions and our interpersonal interactions. It is a fact that for us to
navigate and interact with the world and with our society, we sometimes think about our reasons, we give
reasons, we change our minds, and even think about our habits and character traits in order to make them
virtuous. And it seems that at least most of the times, it is by reﬂection that we do it.
This volume is meant to be a starting point, an invitation to reﬂection, rather than a dogmatic statement about a
closed theory. We think that the ﬁrst step towards reﬂection is the open-minded and critical attitude. As the
exchange between philosophy, epistemology, and cultural psychology has shown, thinking about reasons,
generating knowledge, giving reasons, thinking about oneself and acting are not independent activities. They are
rather sub-parts of an open system, dynamically interacting and feeding one into the other. The work of the
philosophers and psychologists in this book aims to show that even though these activities can be studied
individually by each specialization ﬁeld, an interdisciplinary work is essential to focus on what connects each
other, in this case, on reﬂection.
Yet, it is not possible in only one volume try to answer all the questions about reﬂection and explains its
complete role in our lives. But we hope that, after reaching the end of this volume, we have triggered some
intellectual curiosity and some positive thought about the need for cultivating dialogue beyond boundaries.
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